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• How can (or should) it be helped or hindered? 
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Informal trade (and Informal cross-border trade, ICBT) has an important impact on food security 
in developing economies (Fundira, 2018a; Bouët et al., 2020; Fin24, 2018). It can improve 
livelihoods for women and people living with disabilities. This rapid review will provide additional 
understanding on the importance of informal trade in food security. Additional data on regional 
food movement in sub-Saharan Africa, and remittance trends is explored by request. Specific 
country case studies are also presented.  
Key points to highlight: 
• Although the types of goods carried by informal cross-border traders varies widely, the 
trade in sub-Saharan Africa is dominated by food, especially small-scale groceries and 
fresh produce. 
• In the existing literature “ICBT” often carries a negative connotation, as ‘informal’ can be 
easily confused with ‘illegal’ (Brenton & Soprano, 2018). This term also inaccurately 
reflects the reality of trade flows on the ground. 
• Regional food trade makes an important impact on determining numbers of people in 
need. Kenyan “kadogo” (informal) economy is still dominating the retail sector in 
Eastern Africa (Opiyo & Ogindo, 2018; Battersby & Watson, 2018). However, ICBT 
Western Africa is not seen as a major contributor to the economy (Engel et al., 
2013; Torres & van Seters, 2016), therefore informal trade data from there is limited. 
• Estimates in the change in trade patterns specifically linked to food security: The dearth 
of reliable data on key indicators of ICBT has accentuated the lack of recognition of its 
important economic role in national and regional policies and frameworks (Fundira, 
2018b: 17). Records hardly exist for exchanges of small amounts of food; technical 
observation of borders (monitoring) may be the only option for their quantification 
(Nkendah et al., 2014: 10). It is difficult to get an accurate and aggregate overview of the 
extent of ICBT in the region due to the lack of consistent measurement tools and reliable 
estimates (Torres & van Seters, 2016). If governments do not have serious Food 
Balance Sheets (FBSs) as national food policy documents, it makes it difficult to track 
food security, as was found in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania (Njeru, 2011). 
• Food remitting, and informal trade of staples: More data is available for international 
remittances; less is known about remittances sent by migrants within 
countries. Geographical differences have been found in the data. The impact of 
remitting was positive in Mali (Generoso, 2015), Ethiopia (Abebaw et al., 2020) and 
Nigeria (Obi et al., 2020). However, it needs to be qualified: it enables households to 
solve temporary food security situations, but had no effect on structural food security 
issues (Generoso, 2015).  
• Predicted trade patterns related to food security: The alternative to informal trade for 
many traders is not formal trade, but rather no trading at all (Engel et al., 2013). 
Indirectly, the new African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) has the potential 
to generate significant benefits for informal cross border traders. The private sector 
can play a key role in contributing to ICBT initiatives under the AfCFTA. 
• Help and hindrances for ensuring food security: Governments have a leading role in 
supporting informal trade – however, evidence shows a mostly unsupportive policy 
environment for informal traders, often excluding informal traders from policy planning 
(Fin24, 2018; Battersby & Muwowo, 2018; Battersby, 2019a) or enforcing by-laws which 
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prevent trade. Informal vendor opportunities are often destroyed as a result of these 
development plans (Battersby, 2019b). Municipalities on both sides of the border benefit 
from ICBT, including the re-export of rice, as an integral part of an economic model 
adopted by both public and private actors (Tondel et al., 2020). Some argue that the 
dual categorisation of trade between formal and informal trade should be removed, 
and that formal and informal trade should be viewed as a continuum from small traders to 
large traders (Ndiaye, 2010; Battersby & Muwowo, 2018). 
There is considerable data valuing food security in Sub-Saharan Africa, however, it is not always 
current. For some regions, data on the scale of ICBT’s contribution to food security and food 
movement (trade, remittances, in-kind, etc.) is limited and based on estimates. Evidence for this 
rapid review was mostly taken from grey literature, including working papers and policy briefs. 
Data on the contribution of informal trade for food security was obtained from informal regional 
economy reports (e.g. Economic Community Of West African States, ECOWAS; Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, COMESA), as well as research projects such as the 
Southern African Consuming Urban Poverty (CUP) project. Estimates of informal food trade e.g. 
from USAID’s Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), were used when data was 
unavailable. 
2. Food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa 
According to the Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES),1 sub-Saharan Africa has the 
highest prevalence of food insecurity in the world (55%). Evidence shows variations of food 
security by region: 
• The food security situation in Central and Western Africa is mixed. The number of 
food-insecure people rose to almost 22 million in 2020, which is an increase of over 70% 
from the same period last year (WFP, 2020). Migrant and informal workers in the coastal 
countries Sierra Leone and Liberia were most significantly impacted as they were 
particularly vulnerable due to a deepened recession; the majority of the workforce is 
employed within the informal sector (77% and 86% in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
respectively) (WFP, 2020: 5). In Central Africa, the Central African Republic (CAR) 
remains the hungriest country. According to the latest National Food Security 
Assessment (ENSA)2, published in December 2019, 44% of the CAR population is 
severely or moderately food insecure (1,759,000 people). Some 300,000 people, or 6% 
of the population, is severely food insecure. However, the prevalence of moderate and 
severe food insecurity has decreased slightly from 50% in 2018 to 44% in 2019. 
• Food insecurity remains a significant barrier to greater regional security, growth 
and prosperity in East Africa. Over 27 million people in the greater region are food 
 
1 Until recently, there was not an individual-level measure that could be used to make valid comparisons of food 
insecurity across countries to help identify common causes and risk factors. This changed in 2014 when the 
United Nations FAO Voices of the Hungry project developed an experiential measure of food insecurity, the 
(FIES). The FIES is the first standardised measure of people’s direct experiences of food insecurity appropriate 
for application on a global scale. 
2 [in French] Évaluation Nationale de la Sécurité Alimentaire (ENSA) en RCA 2019. Décembre 2019: 
https://fscluster.org/sites/default/files/documents/presentation_car_ensa_2019.pdf  
   
 
4 
insecure and require humanitarian assistance, a 39% increase in food insecurity over 
2016.3  
• Approximately 44.8 million people in 13 countries of the Southern African region 
suffer from food insecurity, according to the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC, 2020: 8). Food-insecurity increased by almost 10% in the region 
in 2020 compared to the previous year. The main factors responsible included the novel 
coronavirus disease (COVID-19), climate change, conflict and economic challenges 
(SADC, 2020; Paul, 2020). 
Records show that over a quarter (28%) of sub-Saharan Africa was severely food insecure in 
2017 (Smith & Meade, 2019). Food deserts are a feature in this rapidly urbanising 
continent. They have been defined as "poor, often informal, urban neighbourhoods 
characterized by high food insecurity and low dietary diversity, with multiple markets and market 
and non-market food sources but variable household access to food."4 Research has found 
consistently higher levels of food insecurity in the African region than official statistics 
present (Battersby, 2020a). Undernourishment and severe food insecurity, as reported by the 
recent issues of The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World, are on the rise again in 
almost all sub-regions of Africa.5 
3. Informal trade in sub-Saharan Africa 
Informal trade represents commodity flows outside of the formal system, meaning that activity is 
not typically recorded in government statistics or inspected and taxed through official channels. 
These flows vary from very small quantities moved by bicycle, to large volumes trucked over long 
distances. Informal trade is also known as informal cross-border trade (ICBT), informal 
intra-regional trade, or small-scale cross-border trade (SSCBT). However, the distinction 
between ‘small-scale’ and ‘informal’ trade is important. In the existing literature, “informal cross-
border trade/ICBT)” often carries a negative connotation as ‘informal’ can be easily confused with 
‘illegal’ (Brenton & Soprano, 2018). It also inaccurately reflects the reality of trade flows on the 
ground, as traders may indistinctly use both formal and informal crossing channels depending on 
a variety of factors, such as the value of their consignment, the length of the queue at the border, 
or the mood of the individual official on duty (Brenton & Soprano, 2018).  
The potential benefits of informal trade include better food security, faster job creation, 
more poverty reduction, increased tax revenues for authorities, and better long-term 
developmental outcomes (Fundira, 2018a; Bouët et al., 2020). The informal food economy 
includes transporters, processors, shopkeepers, and takeaway food retailers. Street vending is 
considered for its potential as a vocational occupation for people with disabling conditions. 
Although some hawkers are forced into the occupation by necessity or desperation, many 
acknowledge that it provides well for essential requirements, including shelter, food, education, 
 
3 USAID (2018). East Africa: Regional Partnerships for Food Security: 
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/RIGOs_and_Regional_Food_Security.pdf  
4 Battersby J, Crush J (2014). Africa's Urban Food Deserts. Urban Forum, 25(2): 143–51. DOI:10.1007/s12132-
014-9225-5. S2CID 55960422  
5 FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP & WHO. (2017, 2018, 2019). The state of food security and nutrition in the world 
2017. Building resilience for peace and food security. FAO: Rome. 
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and, in the case of migrants, passage to visit their home countries (Gamieldien & van Niekerk, 
2017).  
On average, the informal sector is estimated to account for 38.4% of sub-Saharan African 
economies.6 Informal trade is also significant source of jobs for many poor city-living people 
(Joubert, 2018: 72). Livelihoods for poor women, and by extension poor households, across the 
region can be secured through increased reliable income flows from informal trade (Masinjila, 
2011: 8). It acts as a sort of social security system, absorbing unemployed labour and providing 
cheap products (IMF, 2017; Joubert, 2018: 129); research by Benjamin and Mbaye in 
Francophone Africa (2012: 138) states that “if it were not for informal firms, there would be food 
riots”. 
4. Contribution of informal trade to food security 
Both maize and rice are now the fastest-growing staple food crops in all parts of Africa.7 
Among the cereal crops produced, maize and rice have severe implications for economic 
development in most sub-Saharan African countries, as their contribution to agricultural GDP is 
high.  
The informal sector is a valuable part of food security in sub-Saharan African countries. 
Surveys indicate that a substantial share of ICBT in sub-Saharan Africa concerns staple food 
commodities that have a direct impact on regional food security (including livestock, e.g. cattle) 
(Torres & van Seters, 2016: 22; Fundira, 2018a; Bouët et al., 2020). A large share of regional 
trade is informal, i.e. not recorded in official data (Bensassi et al., 2019). Therefore, official 
statistics hide many important features of the real trade patterns and dynamics in each region, 
and their importance for economic growth, poverty reduction, and food security (Engel et al., 
2013). 
Consumers of all social groups rely on informal food markets as a source of food, but they are 
particularly important for consumers in low-income areas (Mwango et al., 2019: 18). For those on 
low incomes, informal outlets – such as street vendors – are the main, if not only, source of 
affordable, nutritious and safe food (Gamieldien & van Niekerk, 2017). Informal trade provides 
food in affordable unit sizes, provides food on credit, sells fresh produce at lower costs than 
supermarket fresh produce, and sells prepared foods appropriate for households that experience 
income, time, storage and energy poverty (Battersby et al., 2016; Opiyo & Ogindo, 2018; Opiyo & 
Agong, 2021: 9).  
ICBT flows of staples and other agricultural products play a critical role in guaranteeing food 
security, especially in remote villages where the population relies more heavily on food items 
supplied through informal channels than on official distribution (Zarrilli & Linoci, 2020). The 
importance of informal food markets in food security has also been well-documented across 
 
6 This data is for the shadow economy (which is a broader category than just the informal sector): Schneider F, 
Buehn A, Montenegro C (2010). Shadow Economies All Over the World: New Estimates for 162 Countries from 
1999 to 2007, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5356, Washington DC: The World Bank.  
7 FAO & UNICEF, WFP and WHO (2019). The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2018. Building 
climate resilience for food security and nutrition. Rome, FAO: http://www.fao.org/3/I9553EN/i9553en.pdf  
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African cities (Skinner, 2019). The Consuming Urban Poverty (CUP)8 project has demonstrated 
that the informal food retail sector, in many forms (markets, street traders of fresh produce, 
cooked meal vendors, house shops) is a vital component of the food security of the urban poor. 
However, poor households depend on a range of formal and informal food retail sources 
to meet their food needs (Battersby, 2020a). People still depend on the informal sector for 
many day-to-day purchases, as a source of traditional foods, however, supermarkets are 
increasingly present. Informal vendors are re-sellers who often trade in goods that they 
themselves purchase in formal markets (Ambikapathi et al., 2021).  
5. Data on internal migration, remittances,9 and food 
security 
Food remitting also has a role to play in urban and rural food security. In 2005, Africa 
received an estimated USD19 billion in cash remittances, of which USD2.1 billion were from 
other African countries (Chikanda & Crush, 2014: 75; Crush & Caesar, 2017: 11). However, it is 
unknown what proportion of these remittances were spent on goods and investments, including 
food. Due to COVID-19, remittance flows were predicted to fall by 23.1% in the sub-Saharan 
African region in 2020 - the second largest fall globally, according to the World Bank.10 
The International Labour Organization (ILO) estimated that earnings of informal sector workers in 
Africa declined by 81% in the first month of the COVID-19 crisis.11 This could result in 
catastrophic impacts on rural livelihoods throughout the pandemic.12 Often, migrants carry 
money and goods with them when they go back to visit their villages. A few hundred dollars could 
be the difference between subsistence and food insecurity.13 
Recent studies have addressed the links between migration, remittances and food 
security in African countries (Mabrouk & Mekni, 2018; Sulemana et al., 2019). Data from 
Ethiopia (Abebaw et al., 2020) and Nigeria (Obi et al., 2020) show a positive correlation between 
food insecurity and remittances. In Mali, the remittances impact is also positive, although it needs 
to be qualified: they enable households to solve temporary food security situations, but they have 
 
8 The CUP project is located in the African Centre for Cities (ACC) at the University of Cape Town, and in 
collaboration with partner research teams at Copperbelt University (Zambia), the University of Zimbabwe, and the 
Kisumu Local Interaction Platform (KLIP) – a research and policy knowledge hub facilitating urban research in 
Kisumu, Kenya. The full title of the project is Governing Food Systems to Alleviate Poverty in Secondary Cities in 
Africa. 
9 A remittance is a transfer of money, often by a foreign worker to an individual in their home country. Money sent 
home by migrants competes with international aid as one of the largest financial inflows to developing countries. 
10 World Bank Predicts Sharpest Decline of Remittances in Recent History. 22 April 2020: 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/04/22/world-bank-predicts-sharpest-decline-of-
remittances-in-recent-history  
11 ILO Monitor: COVID-19 and the world of work. Third edition. Updated estimates and analysis . 29 April 2020: 
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/documents/briefingnote/wcms_743146.pdf  
12 However, there is evidence that informal employment has increased during economic downturns as a result of 
declining opportunities in the formal economy: Some entrepreneurs have capitalised on the COVID-19 
pandemic’s unique challenges to launch businesses that deliver food to people stuck at home, or run errands for 
those who live abroad but want to help their families living in Zimbabwe: Muronzi C (2021). In Zimbabwe, some 
businesses struggle, others adapt and thrive. 11 February 2021: 
https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2021/2/11/in-zimbabwe-some-businesses-struggle-others-adapt-and-thrive 
13 Adhikari S (2020). COVID-19 is reducing domestic remittances in Africa: What does it mean for poor 
households? 9 June 2020. Blog: https://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/covid-19-reducing-domestic-remittances-
africa-what-does-it-mean-poor-households  
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no effect on structural food security issues (Generoso, 2015). Most of the food insecurity coping 
strategies used by households in South Africa have had long-term detrimental effects (Musemwa 
et al., 2015). Karamba et al. (2011)  point out that migration does not impact the total food per 
capita – the only exception are highly migratory regions in Ghana. Poorer rural households in 
Ghana have increased their dependence on food remittances (Kuuire et al., 2013). In general, 
results indicate that migration creates a shift toward the consumption of less nutritious food 
categories (Mora-Rivera & van Gameren, 2021).  
Geographical differences in remittances have been found: 
• International cash remittances: Receiving international remittances is positively 
associated with more household food security in sub-Saharan Africa (Sulemana et 
al., 2019). More remarkably, however, is that the frequency of receiving remittances 
matters more for this relationship. International remittances represent a critical strategy 
that can improve food security during crises (Obi et al., 2020). 
• Internal cash remittances: Less is known about remittances sent by migrants within 
countries. The World Bank African Migration Project surveyed households in Burkina 
Faso, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda in 2010.14 In each country, a greater 
proportion of internal rather than international cash remittances was spent on 
food. In Kenya, for example, the proportion of cash remittances spent on food was 30% 
for internal remittances, 14% for South-South remittances, and 13% for North-South 
remittances. The equivalent figures in Senegal were 82%, 72%, and 63%, respectively 
(Crush & Caesar, 2017: 11).15  
6. Data on sub-regional variances in food-related ICBT  
Surveys conducted by USAID for several food staples estimate that between 66% and 80% of 
intra-regional staple food trade is not accounted for in official statistics (The World Bank, 
2015). Access to food in sub-Saharan Africa is highly dependent on cross-border markets, 
however, regional estimates vary. For example, Eastern and Southern African countries have 
been more likely to engage in the production and marketing of staple food crops, while West 
African countries intervene in the supply chains of export crops and are much less influential in 
grain markets (Engel et al., 2013: 13): 
Western region 
ICBT contributes 40% in the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
region (Sommer & Nshimbi, 2018: 8; Parshotam & Balongo, 2020). The goods most commonly 
exchanged are staple food commodities that play a key role in meeting food security needs 
(Jouanjean et al., 2016). Parshotam and Balongo (2020) found that the goods traditionally traded 
informally include non-processed foods (i.e. basic food supplies) and re-exported goods 
 
14 Plaza S, Navarrete M, Ratha D (2011). Migration and Remittances Household Surveys in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Methodological Aspects and Main Findings. Preliminary publication. 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265307111_Migration_and_Remittances_Household_Surveys_in_Sub-
_Saharan_Africa_Methodological_Aspects_and_Main_Findings  
15 For more information on rural-urban differences, see African Food Security Urban Network (AFSUN) study: 
(Crush & Caesar, 2017: 11-16). 
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(including value-added agro-processed foods16). There are indications that ICBT rice flows 
from southern Burkina to northern Ghana (Tondel et al., 2020: 36). Unfortunately, CILSS17 has 
not collected data on ICBT between these two countries. Research on informal intra-regional 
trade in the region suggests that coastal West African countries (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, 
and Senegal) mainly export cereals, tubers, fruits and vegetables to land-locked countries 
(Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger), who in turn export mainly livestock to coastal countries (Engel 
et al., 2013). Even if these north-south trade flows are the most important ones, other east-west 
and more complex intra-regional trade flows also exist in the region. However, as these trade 
flows are mainly informal, they are not completely captured by official data.  
Nigeria dominates total Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) imports (52%) 
as well as food imports specifically (51%). The second and third economy of the region, i.e. 
Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, are the main ECOWAS food exporters, largely due to cocoa, followed 
by Nigeria. The main products in informal imports from Nigeria to Benin include transformed 
food products (e.g. wheat flour, non-alcoholic beverages), and vegetable products 
(Bensassi et al., 2019). Nigeria’s heavy dependence on oil and several dysfunctional economic 
policies, along with Benin’s poor business climate, have created an environment for ICBT to 
flourish (Tondel et al., 2020: 76). In Benin and Nigeria, customs are in some way involved in the 
transshipment of imported rice. Municipalities on both sides of the border benefit from ICBT, 
including the re-export of rice, as an integral part of an economic model adopted by both 
public and private actors (Tondel et al., 2020: 88). 
The European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) reviews official statistics 
for informal trade, and also compiles available information from studies on informal 
undocumented intra-regional trade (which mainly concerns food staples). It found that trade 
figures differ considerably between West African countries. It is difficult to get an accurate 
and aggregate overview of the extent of ICBT in the region due to the lack of consistent 
measurement tools and reliable estimates (Torres & van Seters, 2016: 21).  
The World Bank (2015)18 distinguishes three types of intra-regional trade in ECOWAS:  
i. the “arbitrage trade”, as informal transit re-export and trade deflection of staples 
imported from outside the region (e.g. rice and poultry);  
ii. the “border trade” as local international trade motivated by proximity, the porous nature of 
borders, and the local patterns of excess supply and demand, and  
iii. the “regional trade” which occurs along corridors for a handful of foods for which 
important complementarities arise between surplus production and demand areas.  
With regard to volume and economic value, the regional trade (iii) is the most important, with 
livestock and maize being the two most important traded staples in ECOWAS (Torres & 
van Seters, 2016: 22-23). An estimated 30% of staple foods evade formal customs, and the 
 
16 These can include breads, cakes, sauces, or other processed foods. 
17 The Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) has been collecting data on 
informal trade flows of staple food commodities across the borders of West African countries, including volumes 
and prices. These data are collected daily at several border crossings and reference markets in the vicinity of 
borders. 
18 The World Bank combines existing data on formal and informal trade in staple foods. 
   
 
9 
proportion can be much greater for highly perishable fruits and vegetables (Bouët et al., 
2020). 
Eastern region 
TradeMark East Africa (TMEA) – a key institution for enhancing trade in the region – states that 
ICBT accounts for around 60% of all transactions in the East African Community (EAC)19 
(Koigi, 2018: 31). Maize grain was the main commodity traded in the region between October 
and December 2020 followed by dry beans, rice, and sorghum; livestock exports from East 
Africa to the Middle East declined in 2020 due to reduced demand linked to COVID-19. The 
main staple food commodities informally traded across selected borders in Eastern Africa are 
listed in FEWS NET reports (FEWS NET & EAGC, 2021), however, they do not capture all 
ICBT in the region, just a representative sample. 
Case study: Kenya 
Kenya is a maize-deficit country necessitating importation mainly from the EAC countries, with a 
significant portion of the imports being contributed by ICBT, according to USAID.20 It is common 
to find informal traders selling sugar, milk, cooking oil, and maize meal in smaller measures than 
would ordinarily be found on supermarket shelves. These small unit measures are not meant to 
make items cheaper but rather to enable households with low daily incomes to purchase food – 
this informal economy is locally referred to as “kadogo” economy (Opiyo & Ogindo, 2018: 191). 
Kadogo is the dominator of the retail sector, as 2019 figures from market insights firm Nielsen 
show that approximately 70% of fast-moving consumer goods came from this sector.21 
Southern region 
ICBT contributes between 30% and 40% of total intra-regional trade in the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) region (Sommer & Nshimbi, 2018: 8). The cities of 
Mwami and Mchinji, located between Malawi and Zambia, jointly constitute one of the most 
active informal trade hubs in Southern Africa. Here, COMESA has determined that informal trade 
amounts to €2.4 million (USD2.9 million) per month, compared to €1.35 million (USD1.63 million) 
for formal trade. Latest FEWS NET and World Food Programme food security and market 
analysis show that maize flows from Zambia to DRC were the largest, although there were some 
substantial volumes from Mozambique to Malawi, and from Zambia to Tanzania (FEWS NET & 
WFP, 2019). Compared to January 2018, volumes of maize grain traded were significantly 
lower by 79% in 2019; volumes of rice and dry beans also decreased (by 35% and 39%, 
respectively).  
 
19 The East African Community (EAC) is a regional intergovernmental organisation of 6 Partner States: the 
Republics of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, the United Republic of Tanzania, and the Republic of 
Uganda, with its headquarters in Arusha, Tanzania. 
20 Revamping East Africa’s grain trade: https://www.world-grain.com/articles/13288-revamping-east-africas-grain-
trade  
21 Njanja A (2019). ‘Kadogo’ economy rules retail sector. 17 July 2019: 
https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/companies/-kadogo-economy-rules-retail-sector-2257816  




It is difficult to separate the official and informal trade in Central Africa. Cameroon seems 
to have a comparative advantage in producing and exporting food products from the west, 
northwest, and southwest regions (The World Bank, 2013: 8): 
Case study: Cameroon 
Cameroon is the first trading partner of the Central African Economic and Monetary 
Community (CEMAC)22 countries. The western regions of Cameroon are the breadbasket of the 
country. Plantain, cassava, and palm oil are primarily smallholder crops and are important for 
employment and poverty reduction. Approximately 80% of food produced is sold on the markets 
of major urban centres. Products are also exported to Abakaliki and Enugu in south-eastern 
Nigeria; tomatoes and beans are exported to neighbouring countries in the South.23 Trade flows 
of food commodities such as bananas, maize, beans, fish, fruits and vegetables, appear to 
move freely across the border, especially when the amounts involved are small. Records 
hardly exist for these types of exchanges of small amounts of food; technical observation of 
borders (monitoring) may be the only option for their quantification (Nkendah et al., 2014: 10). 
7. How informal trade can be hindered 
Informal cross-border traders face several challenges, which prevents the full developmental 
potential of ICBT from being realised (based on evidence from Bugingo, 2018: 12): 
1. Limited literacy skills  
The majority of informal cross-border traders are partially literate or illiterate, which makes it 
difficult for them to read, understand, and complete the numerous mandatory forms and 
procedures at borders (Brenton & Soprano, 2018: 7). If any support measures provided to them 
are complex, they can also be hard to understand. 
2. Limited access to finance and inadequate start-up capital  
Informal cross border women traders (WICBTs) across the region do not use available formal 
systems/structures for most of their transactions. This makes it difficult for regional trade 
policy initiatives such as those under EAC and the Customs Protocol to have any significant 
impact on informal trade by women (Masinjila, 2011). Some traders have no place to keep their 
savings, and have to pay hefty bribes to avoid being arrested (Koigi, 2018: 31).  
The financial sector sets burdensome conditions on obtaining loans, such as high interest rates, 
and requirements for collateral lacked by most women engaged in ICBT (Brenton & Soprano, 
2018: 7). No banks will issue loans to unlicensed traders without a clearly outlined 
 
22 CEMAC is made up of six States: Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, 
and Gabon. 
23 CIRAD (2006). Quantification des flux transfrontaliers - Etude des flux transfrontaliers de produits agricoles et 
horticoles sr les frontières sud du Cameroun – Rapport Final.  
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development plan.24 Money lenders tend to lend to cross-border traders at punitive rates, and 
borrowers can end up repaying twice what they borrow (Chikanda & Tawodzera: 2017: 18).  
Kenya: In Kisumu, which is largely driven by small-scale informal traders, capital is evidently hard 
to come by as 63% of the traders surveyed have never had any form of financial support for their 
businesses. For those who have received financial support, the most common form of support 
came from savings club members (16%) and family members (8%) (Opiyo & Ogindo, 2018: 193). 
These small-scale, underfinanced food retailers are further burdened by several taxes and 
operating fees, including inspection fees, food handlers license fee, market fees, and in some 
instances protection fees to market cartels and criminal gangs. These costs are passed on to the 
consumer, making food more expensive (Opiyo & Ogindo, 2018: 193). 
3. Slow implementation of existing policies on cross-border trade 
Food insecurity in Africa is severely exacerbated by trade-related barriers, which hinder the 
movement of food from surplus production areas to consumers in neighbouring markets in food 
deficit areas (Bonuedi et al., 2020). Food availability and food access can be significantly 
hampered by higher documentation requirements, and lengthier export and import times 
(Bonuedi et al., 2020). 
4. Limited knowledge about taxes, duties, and tax exemptions  
The informal sector is a hard-to-tax group. Therefore, adoption of presumptive taxation, which at 
least levies a modest tax on the self-employed, can thus lead to greater horizontal equity.25 A 
presumptive tax regime can mean that substantially lower tax rates are paid than under the 
standard regime. However, presumptive tax on informal traders is seen as not being 
practical unless it is supported by a friendly government informal sector policy framework 
that regulates their operations. This is the case in Zimbabwe, where not many traders can 
afford the tax.26 
The introduction of punitive duties on imported goods by governments means that it mostly 
became cheaper to buy food and goods in the country than to import through the informal system 
(Chikanda & Tawodzera: 2017: 10). 
5. The threat of informal fines and confiscation of goods 
Customs officials at some border posts take advantage of this by asking informal cross-border 
traders to pay duties on commodities that should not attract any levies. In the event of failure to 
pay, bribes are solicited to allow the uninformed traders to cross with their goods (Brenton & 
Soprano, 2018: 7).  
 
24 Ousmane Badiane, director for Africa at the International Food Policy Research Institute: 
https://www.mamopanel.org/news/in-the-news/2017/dec/4/agricultural-trade-transforming-informal-economy/ 
25 Tadesse H, Taube G (1996). Presumptive Taxation in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/05389-9781451842135/05389-9781451842135/05389-
9781451842135_A001.xml?language=en&redirect=true  
26 Wisborn Malaya- secretary-general of the Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Association. 10 January 
2021: https://www.thestandard.co.zw/2021/01/10/presumptive-tax-on-informal-traders-not-practical/  
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Informal traders are also frequently treated as criminals and illegals, which makes them 
particularly vulnerable to abuse, corruption, and harassment at the hands of state authorities 
such as border officials, immigration, and the police (Brenton & Soprano, 2018: 7). Faced with 
uncertainty about tariffs and taxes applicable to consignments, many traders will choose to travel 
through a panya (smuggling) route, where personal safety and security is compromised (Fundira, 
2018: 16). 
6. Inconsistent and non-harmonised national laws and policies and their regional 
instruments 
Existing policy frameworks to address food security and to govern the informal sector tend to 
neglect informal retail in the food system. African governments have a history of treating 
informal traders severely, especially during public health crises. Local governments tend 
to favour supermarkets and other formal outlets, often marginalising informal food traders 
either through passive neglect or outright exclusion (Joubert, 2018: 11). Supermarkets are now 
offering goods that were traditionally sold in municipal markets and kiosks, e.g. fruits and 
vegetables, and they are also moving into residential areas, pushing small-scale informal 
traders out of business. 
Zambia: When the government used the military to close down markets during Lusaka’s 2018 
cholera outbreak, farmers who sold their fresh produce to informal traders lost a significant 
amount of income (Resnick, 2020: 73). The National Agricultural Policy is focused on 
improving production and productivity through formal enterprises, including farmers’ co-
operatives and groups, but does not involve informal food trading (Mwango et al., 2019: 21). 
Many of the activities of informal food traders are under the direct purview of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, but it was very difficult to include the informal traders in the incentive 
structures in place as they were not known. For instance, when there is a shortage of maize 
during the lean period and the government, through the Food Reserve Agency (FRA), offloads 
maize to millers in order to stabilise prices, the focus is on the large well-established millers, 
rather than the unregistered hammer millers (Mwango et al., 2019: 23). 
Enforcement of discriminating by-laws 
Kenya: By-laws give and remove the legitimacy to vend (Onyango et al. 2012: 112). The Kisumu 
Municipality by-law states that vending is allowed upon payment of the prescribed fee. However, 
the General Nuisance By-law overrides this provision and can be used to declare street 
vending a public nuisance and therefore illegal. The General Nuisance by-law requires a permit 
issued by the medical officer of health. Health therefore trumps any other consideration. As a 
result, the existing biases against street trade are reinforced over and over again (Battersby, 
2020b: 19). 
South Africa: An imbalance between regulation and support is particularly evident in the informal 
food retail sector. The City of Cape Town’s Single Zoning Scheme, passed in 2013, has been 
criticised for acting in conjunction with the Informal Trading By-Law to further repress the 
informal sector. This effectively rendered 70% of spaza (informal convenience) stores in Cape 
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Town illegal. There are legitimate concerns from a variety of organisations27 that the new 
Informal Trading By-Law places unreasonable conditions on informal traders, thus 
undermining its stated intention of enhancing informal trade.  
Poor policy design frameworks  
Although informal trade accounts for the overwhelming share of regional trade in food staples, 
informal traders are not included in policy planning. City management often favours the 
elites and forgets the experience of the urban majority (Joubert, 2018: 7). Therefore, informal 
vendor opportunities are often destroyed as a result of these development plans (Battersby, 
2019b; Haysom et al., 2020: 27).  
South Africa: Haysom et al., (2020) found that food is absent from almost all urban 
planning and wider urban governance practices and strategic thinking in South Africa. In 
urban areas these controls were activated through by-laws restricting raw milk sales, informal 
food vending, slaughter, waste removal, etc. Haysom et al. (2020: 30) concludes: “Not only is the 
design of the current South African food system driving food insecurity, the obsession with 
outdated (and often colonial informed) planning rules and ordinances, and the enforcement 
thereof, often turn many urban citizens, those trying to eke out a living in the absence of formal 
employment, into criminals, through the enactment of laws and by-laws that criminalised 
activities.” This is particularly the case with informal traders, but spans the entire food system.  
Zambia: For the Kitwe municipality, informal trading was seen as a blemish. Getting rid of the 
traders was in line with their ‘Keep Kitwe Clean’ campaign, aimed at polishing up downtown 
Kitwe as the local government tries to transform it into a modern African city, where 
supermarkets and shopping malls replace informal food traders (Joubert, 2018: 59). 
Zimbabwe: Kadoma City Council has a long running antipathy towards informal traders, common 
across Africa (Kamete, 201328 in Battersby & Watson, 2018: 135-136). There is no consideration 
of the role of street trade in the food system, or of the service it offers in terms of food security for 
the urban poor. 
Imbalanced urban planning policies 
Although the food desert concept may be valuable for African researchers to provoke debates 
about systemic inequality, the food desert policy narrative should be rejected as it is ill-
informed by the lived experiences of food insecurity in African cities. It may also promote policy 
interventions that erode rather than enhance the capacity of the food system to meet the food 
security needs of African urbanites (Battersby, 2019a; Mirzoev and Tull et al. [in preparation]). 
 
27 Western Cape Informal Traders Coalition, Somali Association of South Africa, Cosatu Western Cape, Passop, 
National Consumer Forum, South African Council of Churches, Scalabrini Foundation and Legal Resources 
Centre (2013). Cape Town Zoning Schemes and By-Laws Challenged in the Informal Sector: 
http://www.streetnet.org.za/show.php?id=491 72   
28 Kamete AY (2013). Missing the point? Urban planning and the normalisation of ‘pathological’ spaces in 
southern Africa. Transactions Institute of British Geographers, 38, 639–651. 
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South Africa: Evidence of this is seen in Cape Town where spatial planning and business support 
departments approve the development of shopping malls but seldom engage departments who 
are responsible for managing the informal retail environments (Battersby, 2019b). 
Lack of market infrastructure near borders 
This has been a major stumbling block for business interactions between traders and customers. 
Coupled with poor quality, or absence of storage facilities, this often results in losses, especially 
for perishable stock, affecting mainly the women traders who deal primarily with low value 
products.29 Due to infrastructure discrepancies (such as a lack of water, sanitation, and shelter), 
border conditions for the traders vary from bad to health-threatening, including unsanitary or non-
existent toilets, contaminated food and water, as well as exposure to malaria (Wegerif, 2020; 
Macheng, 2021).  
7. External shocks, and food shortages due to logistical constraints 
There is evidence from East Africa which shows that food shortages in parts of the region are 
caused not by scarcity, but by inability of traders from the region to access those markets 
(Masinjila, 2011: 9). Before the introduction of any transit restrictions in Africa due to COVID-19, 
WICBTs had already stopped crossing borders for business because of disruptions in food 
markets of neighbouring countries and in supply chains (Zarrilli & Linoci, 2020). Climate 
variability and extremes, conflicts, economic slowdowns, and downturns are some of the drivers 
of the recent increases in global hunger rates.30  
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, trade has become not only a question of economic activity but, 
more importantly, of survival. After already a few weeks with no gains, there are pressing fears 
that the COVID-19 crisis will eventually push WICBTs out of business (Zarrilli & Linoci, 2020). 
Research from the International Growth Centre found that the urban poor engaging in informal 
trade with little social protection have been pushed further into the margins, and are struggling 
simply for survival (Haas et al., 2020). Besides the immediate economic impacts on the 
livelihoods of cross-border traders, the inability to continue business as usual is having wider 
negative spillover effects. More effective and targeted social safety nets for the informal sector 
are therefore needed. 
8. High transport costs 
High transport costs remain an impediment to trade, however, market size matters here. If the 
magnitude of transport costs increases, the range of tradable goods narrows: 
Nigeria-Cameroon: Eru31 plays an important role in trade between countries in West and Central 
Africa, especially between Cameroon and Nigeria. Roads on the Cameroon side are particularly 
 
29 COMESA to Construct Border Export Zones for Small Scale Traders – Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA): https://www.comesa.int/comesa-to-construct-border-export-zones-for-small-scale-
traders/  
30 FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP & WHO. (2017, 2018, 2019). The state of food security and nutrition in the world 
2017. Building resilience for peace and food security. FAO: Rome. 
31 Eru is a vegetable found in the forest. Its leaves are used mainly for food and are especially prominent the 
preparation of soups. They are very popular among Nigerians. 
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bad, eru is transported in relatively small vehicles, and it is a particularly perishable good (The 
World Bank, 2013: 47). Transport costs were estimated to make up 42% of the gross 
margin for Eru exported from Cameroon to Nigeria. Small traders engaged in the export of 
eru, bananas, and plantain incur average transport costs of USD 2.67 per ton-km. This is due to 
informal payments to forestry guards, councils, customs, police, quarantine and commerce 
officials along the route make road transport unpopular and undesirable to exporters. 
8. How informal trade can (or should) be helped  
There are several ways where informal trade can be facilitated: 
1. Improving knowledge in the context of increased market linkages through 
information and communications technology (ICT) 
The dearth of reliable data on key indicators of ICBT has accentuated the lack of recognition 
of its important economic role in national and regional policies and frameworks (Fundira, 2018b: 
17). A handful of African countries – such as Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda – have, however, now 
started to collect data on informal trade. Data on ICBT is also consistently collected by the East 
African Grain Council (EAGC), Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), Alliance 
for Commodity Trade in East and Southern Africa (ACTESA), and Brahima Cisse (CILSS). 
Further, the COMESA Simplified Trade Regime (STR) has proved to be an important tool for 
capturing ICBT’s contribution to total trade through the STR form, whereby information is 
captured in the Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA). 
Besides giving indications of food insecurity (Nyariki & Wiggins, 199732 in Njeru, 2011), Food 
Balance Sheets (FBSs)33 are critical tools for food traders (Ziegler, 201034 in Njeru, 2011). They 
facilitate food trade by enabling food traders to link supply and demand, reflecting quantities 
imported and exported through informal trade to assist governments, traders and donors with 
decision-making.35 Yet despite its importance, researchers and policymakers tend to ignore food 
remitting (Crush & Caesar, 2017). The COVID-19 Food Security Response Plan developed by 
COMESA was adopted by the 7th Joint Ministerial Virtual Meeting on Agriculture, Environment 
and Natural Resources in July 2020. This Plan recognises the need for regional FBSs, and also 
for the need for food security statistics. This has given impetus at the regional level for food 
 
32 Nyariki DM, Wiggins S (1997). Household Food Insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa: Lessons from Kenya. British 
Food Journal, 99(7), 249-262. 
33 Food balance sheets (FBSs) show a brief picture of the pattern of the food supply of a country. For each food 
item, it sketches the primary commodity availability for human consumption i.e. the sources of supply and its 
utilisation in terms of nutrient value. However, the FBS exercise can be time-consuming and require additional 
resources for agricultural statistics and analysis (FAO, 2017: 3). This was the case for national FBSs in the three 
EAC member countries (Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania), which contained inaccurate, unreliable and/or 
obsolete data due to lack of timely research by professionals (Njeru, 2011). In some cases, food data were 
prone to political manipulation, and cross-border trade was difficult to capture as most of it was illegal. 
34 Ziegler S (2010). Application of Food Balance Sheets to Assess the Scale of Bush Meat Trade in Central 
Africa. Traffic Bulletin, 22(3). 
35 WFP and FEWS NET (2005). Monitoring Informal Cross-border Trade In Staple Foods In Southern Africa. 
Presented at the FANRPAN Workshop on Maize Marketing and Trade Policies in Southern Africa, 21-22 June 
2005: https://www.fanrpan.org/archive/documents/d00056/presentation_Mhlahla.pdf  
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security statistical analysis.36 More statistics will be produced from household surveys to be used 
for better policies and implementation of concrete projects. 
Tracking ICBT progress 
Progress on ICBT can be tracked through policy frameworks and data collection. The 
African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) was launched on 1 January 2021. Hailed as a 
catalyst for continental integration, the agreement aims to “create a single market for goods and 
services, facilitate the movement of persons, and promote industrial development and 
sustainable and inclusive socio-economic growth on the continent”.37 While the AfCFTA 
promises to boost intra-Africa trade as a whole, little is said on the impact it will have on ICBT 
(Macheng, 2021). ICBT is not unequivocally and ambiguously reflected in the AfCFTA 
agreement, and the separate African Union (AU) Protocol on Free Movement of People. 
However, indirectly, the AfCFTA has the potential to generate significant benefits for 
informal cross border traders. It can help with reducing the costs of ICBT, since it includes 
provisions on non-tariff barriers, trade facilitation, transit, and customs co-operation (Sommer & 
Nshimbi, 2018: 9; Bensassi et al., 2019).  
National strategies for formalisation of ICBT are needed to complement the opportunities offered 
by the AfCFTA. This year, Nigerian manufacturers have reported their readiness to compete in 
the continental market, especially in food.38 AfCFTA will provide an expanded market for Nigerian 
products and services; ensure remedy actions against injurious practices by foreign companies 
and countries; contribute to the formalisation of operations in the informal sector; enhance the 
potential for Nigeria’s business growth, and create opportunity for those in the services sector to 
serve the rest of Africa.  
2. Improving access to technology for informal traders 
Informality means that there is no access to the best production technology, financing structures, 
or innovation capacity building instruments (Malabo Montpellier Panel, 2017). However, 
transformation of the informal sector can also occur through technological innovations: 
Kenya: One initiative, launched in 2014 by the Twinga Foods start-up, has already proven 
beneficial for 2,600 informal traders. The app enables traders to access supplies quickly 
and while saving time by having traceable goods delivered. Meanwhile, producers can avoid 
intermediaries, as well as receive market information and quick payments, overcoming many 
uncertainties inherent to the informal sector (Malabo Montpellier Panel, 2017). 
South Africa: Mastercard and a local technological innovation firm, Spazapp, are offering small 
staple food shops the possibility of connecting to formal markets and digital payment systems 
through a mobile phone app. The Spazapp platform gives traders collective bargaining power to 
order a large variety of products at competitive prices, which they can pay for via their mobile 
 
36 COMESA: https://www.comesa.int/individual-consultant-food-security-statistics-expert/  
37 The African Continental Free Trade Area: https://au.int/en/african-continental-free-trade-area . However, 
experts caution that full implementation of the historic pact, signed in March 2018 at the AU Kigali Summit, may 
take years to materialise.  
38 AfCFTA: Mapping Nigeria’s foray into Africa’s single market. 17 February 2021: 
https://www.vanguardngr.com/2021/02/afcfta-mapping-nigerias-foray-into-africas-single-market/  
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phones using Mastercard’s digital wallet, Masterpass. The innovation has already directly linked 
4,500 informal traders to leading consumer brands like Unilever and Tiger Brands food and 
beverage company (Malabo Montpellier Panel, 2017).  
3. Improving access to start-up capital 
Financing and access to capital is another challenge to the informal food retail sector. Mobile 
money can help small-scale traders access credit to seize opportunities for higher value addition 
by bridging the information gap between borrowers and financial institutions.39 
4. Inclusion in policy planning 
It is essential to understand the dynamics of the informal food retail sector because of its vital 
role in ensuring greater access to food (Battersby et al., 2016; Haysom et al., 2020: 52). Policies 
and planning should also support food retailing in places where there is plenty of foot traffic, such 
as around public transport hubs (Joubert, 2018: 33). Re-inserting the informal food system into 
governance and planning decisions could provide new ways for local government to plan their 
market management strategies (Battersby & Muwowo, 2018: 128). 
Kenya: Kisumu City is in the process of developing a detailed spatial plan for the extended areas 
of the city. Mixed land use is recommended for informal settlements in transition like Kogony 
(Opiyo & Agong, 2021). This should include commercial and residential premises, and support 
for informal food retailers to develop food retail outlets that comply with hygiene and safety 
standards within residential areas and along transport routes (Battersby, 2021). 
Zambia: Different line ministries and government agencies are tasked with implementing policy 
and regulations relevant to the informal food sector. The Local Government Act, Chapter 281, 
provides the general framework that defines the functions of local authorities. Given that food 
markets operate under the purview of local councils, this Act provides a very important context 
for informal food vendors (Mwango et al., 2019: 22). The Markets and Bus Station Act, Chapter 
290, gives municipal and city councils wide-ranging powers to control and manage markets and 
bus stations, and is thus a key piece of legislation affecting informal food markets. 
Recognising women in informal trading activities 
Cross-border trade facilitation must integrate a gender element (Brenton & Soprano, 2018: 
4). In order to strengthen the notion that women informal traders are also an important client of 
Ministries of trade and RECs, it is essential to address the subject of informality in mainstream 
trade policy making. If these and other gender-specific constraints are effectively tackled, ICBT 
can turn into a vibrant micro-entrepreneurial reality with significant potential to help alleviate 
poverty, contribute to food security, and empower women in Africa (Machenga, 2021). WICBT 
should also be viewed as an important constituency of RECs, Ministry of Trade, and other 
government institutions. Because they create wealth and employment, WICBT should deserve 
 
39 Zarrilli S, Lopez M (2020). Leveraging digital solutions to seize the potential of informal cross-border trade. 29 
April 2020. UNCTAD: https://unctad.org/news/leveraging-digital-solutions-seize-potential-informal-cross-border-
trade  
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the same tax reduction incentives as those given to multi-national enterprises (MNEs) (Ndiaye, 
2010; Joubert, 2018: 32). 
Improving border market infrastructure 
Providing potable water, sanitation and adequate protection from the elements for markets and 
informal traders is important for helping to ensure food safety (Smit, 2018: 99). In recent years 
RECs in Eastern and Southern Africa have begun harmonising their phytosanitary (SPS) rules 
(Engel et al., 2013: 19). COMESA plans to construct at least six border export zones for the 
Small-Scale Cross-Border Trade Initiative (SSCBTI) project in the selected sites between Zambia 
and Malawi, Zimbabwe, DRC and Tanzania (Gakunga, 2020a). These zones are based on the 
stakeholders’ needs, and will contain border security teams, and a restroom, amongst others. 
5. Harmonised national laws and policies and their regional instruments 
The alternative to informal trade for many traders is not formal trade, but rather no trading 
at all (Engel et al., 2013: 8). Therefore, supportive laws and policies are important. Research 
shows that reductions in delays from documentary and border compliance promise to be 
the most effective trade facilitation reforms to enhance food security in Africa (Bonuedi et al., 
2020). 
RECs and development partners have been implementing dedicated measures to support 
informal traders (Brenton & Soprano, 2018: 6). The most ambitious efforts to facilitate ICBT are 
from the EAC and COMESA, which have adopted a simplified trade regime (STR) consisting of 
instruments and mechanisms tailored to the trading requirements of small-scale traders that are 
decentralised to border areas where informal trade is rampant. For example, the Great Lakes 
Trade Facilitation Project (GLTFP) is funded by the World Bank to facilitate cross-border trade 
between the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda; as well as increase the capacity for commerce and 
reduce the costs, time and harassment faced by traders (Nkendah et al., 2014: 22) - especially 
small-scale and women traders (Skinner, 2016: 32; Brenton & Soprano, 2018: 6; Zarrilli & Linoci, 
2020) - thereby increasing availability of food (Gakunga, 2020b).40  
Linking with the formal food sector trade 
Informal traders already do a lot of business with the formal sector, therefore, their economies 
are already linked (Battersby & Muwowo, 2018: 137; Fin24, 2018). Long-standing practices 
and formal rules form a resilient rural informal economy that runs parallel to the formal 
economy, interacting with it along the value chain. This is the case for the groundnut and coffee 
sectors, for instance, where smallholders sell their crops to duly licensed processing companies, 
often via intermediaries or co-operatives (Malabo Montpellier Panel, 2017).  
 
40 STRs do not rule out the relevance of import and export permits for certain agricultural foods and animal 
products, meaning that traders are required to apply for such permits where necessary (Fundira, 2018b: 15).  




Formalisation of ICBT in Africa is seen as a popular viewpoint. Some governments 
acknowledge the size and existence of the informal food sector, but policy is strongly biased 
towards formalisation, as in Zambia (Mwango et al., 2019: 25). Reductions in red tape and other 
non-tariff barriers should also encourage the formalisation of Africa’s huge – but difficult to 
quantify – informal trade flows, further boosting revenues, tempering food price increases, and 
improving food security (Castell, 2021).  
Some argue that the dual categorisation of trade between formal and informal trade should be 
removed, and that formal and informal trade should be viewed as a continuum from small 
traders to large traders (Ndiaye, 2010). Rather than criminalising those engaged in informal 
commerce, it would be advisable to focus on facilitating formal trade while also focusing on the 
providing safer conditions for informal traders (Engel et al., 2013: 38).  
Inclusivity of informal trade in policy planning 
Local government potentially has an important role to play in deciding where supermarkets are 
located, how big they are, how they are designed (for example, whether they are accessible to 
pedestrians) and whether they offer surrounding space for informal traders (Smit, 2018: 98).  
Civil society organisations (CSOs play key roles in shaping food security efforts through 
food system interventions in the form of food banks, community gardens, and activism (Hunter-
Adams, 2020: 3; Wegerif, 2020). For example, informal economy workers’ organisations across 
the global economy call on governments at all levels to partner with Streetnet International 
Alliance of Street Vendors.41 
The non-recognition of the private sector and heavy regulation of agri-food marketing and 
trade, for cereals in particular, has favoured the development of a vast informal sector, including 
ICBT in locally produced staples in Sub-Saharan Africa (Tondel et al., 2020: 47). However, the 
private sector can play a key role in contributing to ICBT initiatives under the AfCFTA and BIAT42 
Action Plan. In fact, the African Export Import Bank (AFREXIMBANK) has expressed significant 
interest in supporting the extension of trade finance and payment products to informal cross-
border traders, and many e-commerce players identify the informal sector as a crucial market 
(Sommer & Nshimbi, 2018: 9). 
Regarding food security, there is an example of collaborative urban governance in Africa that 
is worth learning from: 
Kenya: In Kisumu City, like most urban areas in Kenya, legal and illegal forces shape the local 
food system. One example of these co-operatives is Jubilee Community Based Organization for 
 
41 The aim of StreetNet is to promote the exchange of information and ideas on critical issues facing street 
vendors, market vendors and hawkers (i.e. mobile vendors) and on practical organising and advocacy strategies: 
http://streetnet.org.za/2020/05/22/covid-19-and-the-worlds-two-billion-informal-economy-workers/  
42 The Boosting Intra-African Trade (BIAT) Action Plan, which provides the leading framework for addressing 
challenges to intra-African trade that are particularly acute for ICBTs. It is the sister initiative of AfCFTA. 
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informal traders (Hayombe et al.43 in Battersby & Watson, 2018: 123). The Kisumu Action Team 
brought together a range of stakeholders (including local government, informal traders’ and civil 
society organisations) to develop an inter-sectoral strategy for Kisumu that included a number of 
planned interventions relating to food, such as the upgrading of marketplaces, and promotion of 
local food production (Onyango & Obera, 2015; Smit, 2018: 100). 
6. Responses to external shocks 
A new report commissioned by the Commonwealth Secretariat proposes recommendations on 
how governments can help ensure informal trade survival during COVID-19.44 
7. Transportation aids 
Countries should consider creating a special travel document for informal cross-border 
traders to make it easier for them to legally and affordably cross borders for trade purposes. 
Currently, a substantial percentage of informal cross-border traders are unable to acquire 
passports on account of cost. The high frequency with which small-scale traders cross 
international borders exacerbates the often already high cost of passports, due to the need to 
renew their passport several times a year. Informal cross-border traders instead tend to use 
temporary entry provisions (such as day passes) to travel for business in neighbouring countries 
(Sommer & Nshimbi, 2018: 9-10). Alternatively, an approach similar to the one adopted by the 
EAC, where citizens of EAC member states can use the national registration/identity documents 
of their respective country to travel to other member states of the EAC, could be considered. 
  
 
43 Hayombe PO, Owino FO, & Awuor FO (2018). Chapter 8: Planning and governance of food systems in Kisumu 
City. In Battersby J & Watson V (Eds.) “Urban Food Systems Governance and Poverty in African Cities”. 
pp116-127. Routledge, ISBN 9781315191195. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315191195  
44 Saha A, Abebe O (2020). Five ways governments can help small businesses in the informal sector survive 
COVID-19. Blog: 29 June 2020: https://thecommonwealth.org/media/news/blog-five-ways-governments-can-help-
small-businesses-informal-sector-survive-covid-19    
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